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All for efficiency and efficiency for all – Dispelling myths about “costly” new quality 
attributes in food products 
 
James Sterns, Patricia Aust Sterns, Jeffrey Burkhardt 
 
Introduction 
Throughout the world, agriculture and food firms and their supply chains are 
being forced to change how they produce and supply their products.  Driving this 
evolution is a combination of market forces that are mandating new attributes in food 
products.
1   Traceability, identity preservation, certification programs, labeling for 
country-of-origin and/or GMO content, and production standards for assuring animal 
welfare all exemplify these types of emerging food product attributes.   When adopted, 
each of these product attributes requires firms to establish processes for creating, 
documenting and supporting assertions and guarantees about the existence of a specific 
quality attribute—all of which can have significant out-of-pocket costs for firms.  Hence, 
a common perception is that the introduction of new quality attributes in food products 
creates inefficiencies in the food system.  
But is the adoption of new product attributes inefficient?  Does equating “costly” 
to “inefficient” mis-specify the problem and ignore many substantive issues?  The 
purpose of this paper is to discuss different potential responses to emerging changes in 
food markets.  And in so doing, the paper highlights for both economists and decision 
makers the implicit assumptions and value choices embedded in any discussion about the 
“efficiency” of these changes. 
   2
Research Question 
As new quality attributes for food products emerge, what are the relative 
“efficiencies” of alternative market responses to changing preferences for food product 
attributes?  In order to answer this question, the following a priori issues must be 
resolved: 
•  In the analysis, which costs are quantified and monetized? 
•  In the analysis, whose preferences are expressed in the market place? 
•  What level of performance is the basis for measuring “efficiency”:  firms, supply 
chains, or the institutional environment (i.e., short-term cost minimization for a 
particular firm, short-term cost minimization for a particular supply-chain, 
adequacy of the market’s ability to meet heterogeneous preferences, the selection 
of a particular institutional environment which dictates the most 
profitable/competitive combination of inputs/firms/supply chains)? 
In the following section, these a priori issues are briefly discussed within the context of 
different understandings of the term “efficiency.” 
 
Efficiency:  It’s A Matter of Perspective  
Four general areas of academic pursuit treat the concept of  “efficiency” 
somewhat differently.  In the paragraphs that follow, these four perspectives are 
presented, and how each perspective addresses the a priori issues is discussed. 
“Efficiency” and the business school/management field:  Efficiency is perceived 
as cost minimization.  The most efficient firm, supply chain or regulatory environment is 
the one that has the lowest costs for those firms directly linked to the market transaction   3
at hand.  Thompson and Strickland, in their discussion of “driving forces,” provide an 
excellent example of this perspective. These authors note that, “The low cost of e-mail 
and fax transmission has put mounting competitive pressure on the relatively inefficient 
and high-cost operations of the U.S. Postal Service—sending a one-page fax is cheaper 
and far quicker than sending a first-class letter; sending e-mail is faster and cheaper still 
(p. 97).”  When assessing relative efficiencies, the only costs that are quantified and 
monetized in the analysis is the cost of achieving a very narrowly defined desired 
outcome, in this case, the delivery of information from point A to point B.  The only 
preferences that matter are those of the persons or firms who both desire the outcome and 
have access to the resources necessary to be able to chose among the alternatives (e.g., if 
a small firm does not own a fax machine, nor subscribe to an internet service, then the 
first class letter may be the most efficient alternative; so, does that mean the firm is 
inefficient?). 
“Efficiency” and neoclassical economics:  Efficiency is a ratio of some 
combination of scarce resources that are used to generate some combination of outcomes.  
In broad terms, the efficient outcome is the one in which the “maximum” output is 
generated with a fixed amount of scarce resources.   Welfare economics, building upon 
the works of Pareto, Edgeworth, Pigou and others, is primarily concerned with questions 
of efficiency so defined.  In theory, social welfare functions and general equilibrium 
analysis account for all costs and all outputs within a market setting (caveats about 
simplifying assumptions duly noted).  As Blaug observes, the concern is with making the 
biggest cake possible, not with the number of slices or the size of any particular slice of 
the cake.  Hence, issues regarding whose preferences are expressed in the market place   4
are largely ignored (i.e., Blaug asserts that there is an efficiency-equity trade-off but 
insists on “the role of the economist as the special custodian for society of the efficiency 
view of social and economic problems…(p. 608)”). 
  “Efficiency” and institutional economics:  As Arrow, Samuels, Schmid and 
others have noted, there are an infinite number of potential institutional environments, 
and for each institutional environment, there are different relative factor prices and hence 
different “efficient” outcomes. Rutherford elaborates on this point by noting that any 
constrained optimization exercise includes a particular system of institutions and property 
rights that, in turn affect transactions costs and the equilibrium position achieved.  A shift 
in property rights will shift the equilibrium position that results, but each equilibrium will 
be efficient given those constraints.  Rutherford then concludes that “comparisons across 
different institutional regimes require more than a reference to conditions of efficiency 
(p. 153).”  Building on Blaug’s analogy, institutional economists are interested in what 
kind of cake gets made, as well as how the cake gets sliced and distributed.  Some market 
agents will prefer chocolate, others lemon cake; some will prefer large pieces others 
small.  “Who gets to chose the flavor and the distribution?” are as an important questions 
as “what is the biggest cake we can make given a fixed set of resources?”
2    
  “Efficiency” and philosophy/ethics:  Ethical efficiency refers to a practice or 
policy that optimally reflects a society’s conception of right and wrong.   In addition to 
consumer preferences, people also display a set of moral preferences that lead them to 
endorse or withhold support from (usually in the form of avoidance behavior) products or 
actions (Sagoff).  Occasionally, withholding support – especially if it means seeking 
alternatives – may appear to involve transaction or other kinds of costs.  However, the   5
question is whether these are perceived as costs to the members of society who hold 
certain ethical values.   Indeed, it may appear to a society that costs occur when practices 
do not optimally reflect dominant social values.  Like “efficiency” in institutional 
economics, “ethical efficiency” is concerned with the kind of cake we are making (or 
allowing to be made), acknowledging that some kinds of cakes must never be made, 
however inexpensively or “efficiently” (in the neoclassical sense) they can be made. 
 
Comparing Responses:  How might each be “efficient”? 
  Different perspectives about efficiency and responses to the introduction and 
adoption of new product attributes are closely related issues.  Based upon empirical 
observations and anecdotal evidence, we assert that there are four broadly conceptualized 
responses to the introduction of new product attributes into a market:   
•  Reactive--Fight 
•  Reactive--Begrudging compliance 
•  Reactive--Adaptive Opportunism 
•  Proactive--Anticipatory value-centric choices 
In some cases, these reactions could be pursued simultaneously or in tandem.  However, 
the following discussion treats each response independently. 
  Reactive—Fight:  If a decision maker sees a new product attribute as nothing 
more than additional costs to the firm’s activities, the response will likely be “fight.”  The 
firm chooses to invest its resources in resisting program implementation through 
lobbying, public relation campaigns and legal channels.  The presumption is that the 
status quo is the more efficient market outcome, and new product attributes only add   6
inefficiencies.  Hence, short run costs to defend the status quo will have long-term 
benefits resulting from the preservation of the current set of product attributes.   
  For example, U.S. retailers and importers demonstrated this strategy during the 
2002 Farm Bill debate over country-of-origin labeling.  These segments of the fresh 
produce and meat industries strongly lobbied against passage of this mandate as the Farm 
Bill was being debated in Congress.  Their arguments often were based on the assertion 
that the programs would “add costs” without certainty about the value the labeling 
program would offer consumers.   
  Reactive—Begrudging Compliance:  The firm seeks strategies to minimize the 
costs of implementing new product attributes and/or ways to transfer costs either to other 
firms within the supply chain or to end-consumers.  The “efficient” response is to 
minimize costs for the firm, perhaps to the detriment of its supply chain relationships. 
  Having lost the political fight over the 2002 Farm Bill, many agri-food industry 
participants are speculating that retailers and importers will attempt to transfer the costs 
of the mandated country-of-origin labeling program to producers and shippers and/or 
consumers (Karst).  The response is to maintain, as closely as possible, the status quo cost 
structure because of a belief that this maintains the most efficient alternative for retailers 
and importers. 
  Reactive—Adaptive Opportunism:  The firm sees emerging new product attributes 
as offering market opportunities, and uses a new attribute as the basis for diversifying its 
product mix.  New products can be developed which target emerging market niches.  The 
“efficient” response is to find optimal solutions and supply chain relationships that are 
profitable in the new markets.   7
  One example of this type of reactive strategy is what some have called the 
“organic-industrial complex” (Pollan). Organic food traditionally has been considered a 
niche market, particularly well suited for small farmers and like-minded consumers with 
strong concerns about the environment, health effects of pesticides, and the social 
structure of rural America. Organic farming has been seen by some as a more natural way 
of farming as well as a more natural way of life.  
But with the growing market volume and share of organic foods, large-scale agri-
food companies have entered the niche market.  One of these large-scale companies is 
Horizon Organic, a publicly held corporation that has consolidated many small-scale 
regional organic food companies and now has a nation-wide market presence with 
nationally branded products.  Niche marketing is giving way to mass marketing, with 
critics like Pollan accusing large scale companies of co-opting the organic market.  Yet, 
through economies of scale, companies like Horizon Organic are able to lower 
production costs, and hence, by certain measures, they have become the “efficient” 
producers (assuming that such traits as being produced on “small” farms are not essential 
for products to be “organic”).  
  Pro-active—Anticipatory value-centric choices:  The firm anticipates changes in 
the market and the underlying widespread changes in the ethical values of a society.  
Hence, the firm is in the position to strategically examine a new product attribute within a 
broader context of those values.  All markets are embedded in a larger societal valuing 
system (i.e., a legal-economic nexus), and these markets only function once the value 
choices about “what should be” have been made or imposed.  The “efficient” response 
here is to acknowledge that consumer preferences are dependent upon these embedded   8
value choices.  Any firm that ignores the underlying valuing process is limited in its 
ability to proactively anticipate changes in market trends and may ultimately have no 
other choice but to employ the “fight” and/or “begrudging compliance” strategies. 
  One example of this type of pro-active strategy in the US food sector is Ben and 
Jerry’s ice cream.  Ben and Jerry’s is one of the classic cases of socially responsible 
corporations in the US food industry. Its commitment has been exemplified by its actions 
as well as its commitment to monitoring the company’s social progress through social 
auditing. In the past, Ben and Jerry’s has produced a Social Performance Report as a 
counter-part to the financial reports in its annual reporting system. The Social 
Performance Report covers aspects including workplace conditions, diversity, socially 
aligned suppliers, the environment, franchise operations, marketing and consumer 
relations, international operations, and philanthropy. However, Ben and Jerry’s has 
undergone sweeping changes since it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unilever. It 
remains to be seen if the pro-active social agenda of the original founders and 
management will be continued under the new management team. 
  A second example of value-centric choices is fair trade labeled coffee such as that 
sold by the company Equal Exchange. In the US, fair trade labeling is conducted by 
TransFair USA, the only third-party certification agency for Fair Trade practices in the 
US.
3 TransFair labeled coffee is currently available through 97 certified coffee roasters 
and importers at over 7,000 retail outlets as well as on the internet.  Fair trade products 
demonstrate not only consumers’ willingness to make trade-offs between low costs and 
“higher-order” ethical concerns, but also the willingness of firms to pro-actively adopt 
business models that anticipate emerging changes in societal values.   9
 
Implications/Results  
  The various responses to the introduction of new quality attributes of food 
products noted in the previous section demonstrate two key issues.  First, firms must 
make choices about their responses to the introduction of new product attributes.  Second, 
firms also must make choices about which perspective of “efficiency” matters to their 
firm’s decision-making processes.  If efficiency is perceived as cost-minimization, then a 
fight or begrudging compliance response is likely.  If efficiency is perceived as a relative 
construct dependent upon the institutional setting, then a more adaptive, opportunistic 
response is likely.  If efficiency is framed quite broadly to include ethical concerns, then 
a firm is likely to have anticipated the introduction of the new attributes and may have 
already implemented specific marketing strategies that reflect this pro-active perspective. 
  A second implication of these observations is that making comparisons of the 
“efficiency” of different market scenarios has very limited analytic merit.  The critical 
point made by institutional economists with respect to efficiency is the normative aspect 
of the concept. Efficiency is a theoretical concept derived from the standard neoclassical 
model of constrained optimization. However, efficiency is a relative construct dependent 
on the assumptions and given institutional and income distributions of the model.  
Schmid expresses this best by asking the question, “Efficiency for whom?” This question 
highlights an inescapable fact:  there are winners and losers in every assignment of 
endowments and allocation of resources, income, wealth and profits, and who gets to be a 
winner or loser differs in every assignment.   10
Modern economists are guilty of sloppy writing (or perhaps cleverly disguised 
advocacy) with respect to the term efficiency. Used alone what does it mean – productive 
efficiency, Pareto efficiency, economic efficiency?  To assert that a particular outcome is 
“efficient” begs the question, who benefits from how this term is being defined and used?  
The value-laden prescriptive nature of the “efficiency construct” is unavoidable. 
 
Conclusions 
Firms must make choices about how best to respond to changing market forces 
and the introduction of new product attributes in food products.  This requires that they 
resolve conflicting internal incentives, such as trade-offs between technical efficiencies 
and ethical efficiencies.  These choices, by definition, cannot be based on a simple 
decision rule like, “choose the efficient option.”  No such singular, uniquely specified, 
globally optimal option exists. 
  Since markets do not exist in a steady-state vacuum but emerge from complex 
systems in which society makes value choices, firms have strategic options when 
challenged by changing values and preferences.  These include ignore/fight changes, 
begrudgingly accept changes but actively seek to transfer costs to customers and/or 
suppliers, observe changes and embrace them as new market opportunities, or proactively 
anticipate and plan for changes.  How firms and supply chains conceptualize “efficiency” 
will influence which option is chosen. 
  A blind faith in cost minimization as a proxy for efficiency will ultimately 
undermine the long-term viability of a firm.  Many presumed gains in efficiencies 
actually involve cost shifting and not cost savings. The question is to whom costs are   11
shifted.  Under an adaptive opportunistic strategy, a firm may actually shift costs to the 
“laggards” – those that have failed to take note of emerging or potential markets, and 
hence will have to move quickly to adjust when those markets become reality.  In the 
case of a proactive approach, costs may be shifted to consumers for whom these are 
either not costs at all, or who willingly absorb those costs for the sake of “higher order 
preferences,” namely, ethical values.   In the final analysis, firms often face a choice:  to 
make a decision correctly (i.e., focus on a narrow conceptualization of efficiency such as 
cost-minimization) or to make the correct decision (e.g., think broadly about the variety 
of efficiencies discussed in this paper).   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Key market forces that are evolving include consumer preferences, government and industry 
regulations (both mandatory and voluntary), NGO pressure groups (e.g., environment, social 
justice), advertising, changing technology (including information on scientific advancement, e.g. 
nutrition and health), social norms (e.g., more women working outside the home, social attitudes 
about health and food (verses individual attitudes included in ‘tastes and preferences’)), and 
media hype over these issues and events.   
 
2 The reader should note that Blaug strongly rejects this broader analysis.  Quoting him, 
If we refuse, even in principle, to distinguish allocative efficiency from distributive 
equity, we must perforce reject the whole of welfare economics and with it any 
conventional presumption in favour of competitive markets, and indeed, in favour of the 
price mechanism as a method of allocating scarce resources.  Arguments for coordinating 
economic activity by markets would then have to be expressed in terms of political 
philosophy – for example, that markets diffuse economic power – and economics would 
in consequence have to become a totally different subject (p. 608). 
Most institutional economists would probably agree with Blaug about the consequence of 
rejecting the efficiency-equity assertion.  But unlike Blaug, they probably would celebrate 
economics becoming a totally different subject. 
 
3TransFair USA is one of 17 members of the international umbrella organization, the Fair Trade 
Labeling Organization (FLO). The FLO sets and monitors fair trade standards for a number of 
products including coffee, tea, bananas, chocolate, honey, vanilla, orange juice, and others. 
 